ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he private debt market is the primary source of external funds for most small and mid-sized firms. In a frictionless market, any firm with a positive net present value investment opportunity would receive the required funds (Petersen and Rajan 1994) . Unfortunately, frictions such as information asymmetry prevent funds from flowing to some firms that have profitable investment opportunities. Implementing mechanisms that mitigate the existing frictions to a level necessary to secure financing is in the best interests of these small and mid-sized firms. One possible alternative is for firms to agree to provide additional information, ex-post, and to allow the commercial lender greater monitoring capabilities. A potential application of greater monitoring capabilities is continuous reporting (CR).
Simply stated, continuous reporting means "making digitized information available through electronic channels simultaneously with its creation," (Elliott 2002, pp. 140) . With today's systems, many businesses are capturing transactions continuously, making continuous reporting of those transactions both possible and relatively easy (Alles et al. 2002) . While the type of information is important, the timeliness of receiving the information is critical because information that arrives too late to affect a decision is virtually worthless (Demski 1980; Demski and Feltham 1976; Feltham 1972) . CR is one viable method to ensure banks receive information about a firm's performance in a timely manner. This continuous reporting (monitoring) interaction between a bank and a borrower may provide the bank with sufficient information about a firm's affairs "so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit to mitigate" information asymmetries (Petersen and Rajan 1994) .
Utilizing the Internet as the backbone, firms and commercial lenders could be connected. In such a CR environment, the velocity of communication between the borrower and the lender increases dramatically, allowing the lender to continuously monitor the financial condition of the borrower through evergreen financial statements and ratios generated from real-time accounting systems (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) . CR should facilitate and accelerate the communication between the lender and the borrower regarding loan performance while the loan is outstanding, thus reducing the lender's uncertainty regarding the borrower's financial condition. Reducing uncertainty minimizes default risk, thereby allowing the lender to accept the loan, ceteris paribus (Palepu et al. 1997 ).
For CR to be successful in the commercial lending domain, loan officers would have to be confident in its ability to adequately monitor borrowers' financial condition. More specifically, if loan officers lack confidence in CR, we would not expect them to positively incorporate that monitoring tool in their loan approval decisions. This study explores the issue of loan officers' confidence and CR. We find that the higher the level of confidence the loan officer had in his/her loan approval decision, the higher the loan approval probability assigned to the loan application. However, that effect was not consistent across monitoring types (Traditional vs. CR). Our results suggest that loan officer confidence only impacts the loan approval probabilities for the traditional monitoring cases. Confidence did not significantly influence loan approval probabilities for the CR cases; although, the loan approval probabilities for the CR, low confidence cases exceeded 50 percent.
PRIOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTION
To our knowledge, there is only one study that empirically examines the effect CR has on the commercial lending application process; Searcy et al. 1 and loan risk class (high, low) is administered between subjects. The banking relationship (new, existing) employs a within-subjects design. The case involves a medium-sized borrower seeking a $1,000,000 line of credit. The case provides background information and 26 facts the loan officers can use to make a loan approval decision (Beaulieu 1994; Blackwell et al. 1998; and Danos 1989) . The 26 facts describe accounting (8), character (6), industry (7), and company-specific (5) issues consistent with Beaulieu (1994) . The lenders repeat the experiment a second time under the assumption the loan packet is from an existing client, as opposed to a new client. Searcy et al. (2009) find that those companies considered high risk have a significantly higher loan approval rate if the company is willing to provide CR information compared to those high risk companies providing only quarterly information (i.e., traditional reporting). The authors do not find any results for the companies considered low risk. The findings are consistent across both banking relationships. The participants are also asked to indicate their level of confidence in assigning the loan approval probability. On a seven-point scale, ranging from not confident (0) to very confident (6), the loan officers appeared confident in their loan approval decisions (4.36 for new clients and 4.96 for existing clients). Our study centers around that last point, confidence in the loan approval decision. We use the data from Searcy et al. (2009) to explore the question:
Research question: Does loan officer confidence influence the loan approval decisions?
Taylor (1975, p77) defines confidence in decisions as the "self-rated confidence in the correctness of the decision". Danos et al. (1989) indicate that early in the loan application process lenders have high-levels of confidence in their credit-granting decisions. The authors indicate that lenders attain that confidence based on general background information and highly summarized financial data. The authors also find that in most cases subsequent information processed by the lenders did not alter the initial loan approval judgment but only increased their confidence in the initial judgment. That finding is consistent with prior studies indicating confidence increasing with additional information; even though judgmental accuracy remains relatively stable (e.g., Oskamp 1965; Einhorn & Hogarth 1978). While the initial judgment may be accurate (Murphy and Winkler 1977), overconfidence in judgments could lead to dire consequences (e.g., loan losses). Russo and Schoemaker (1992) find that primary knowledge does reduce overconfidence to some degree, but does not eliminate it altogether. Searcy et al.'s (2009) experimental design precludes us from investigating overconfidence; however, the within subjects design will allow us to examine the change in confidence. 2 Table 1 provides the demographic statistics. Since our interest is the interaction of confidence and monitoring type, we divided the sample data between low confidence and high confidence. 3 As shown in the table, most of the loan officers had high confidence in assigning a loan approval probability. The age of the loan officers range from 42.8 (Traditional, Low confidence cell) to 48.6 (CR, low confidence cell). The loan officers' bank experience range from 19.7 years (traditional, low confidence cell) to 23.0 years (traditional, high confidence cell).
RESULTS
The age and bank experience are similar to those found in other studies using commercial lenders (e.g., Wright and Davidson 2000). The response means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2 . Based on reported means, the loan approvals for new clients are much higher when the loan officer has high confidence, regardless of monitoring type. However, the loan approval probability is above 50 percent for the low confidence/CR treatment indicating that the probability of loan approval for CR clients is greater than 50 percent even though the loan officers had low confidence in making the decision. Two types of tests were used to investigate the statistical significance of the loan approval probabilities across the treatment cells, ANOVA and Contrasts. Table 3 reports the ANOVA results. The CONFIDENCE variable is significant (p-value 0.002) indicating that the higher the level of confidence the loan officer had in his/her decision, the higher the loan approval probability.
We are most interested in the MONITORING *CONFIDENCE interaction in the model. That interaction is significant (p-value 0.037) suggesting that loan approval probability is influenced by loan officer confidence. Figure  1 displays the relationship between loan officer confidence and monitoring type. The difference in means is greater for the low confidence condition (31.42-traditional vs. 53.70-CR) compared to the high confidence condition (59.82-traditional vs. 63.90-CR). Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between confidence and approval is not consistent across both monitoring types. 1 The Loan Approval Response Model contains four dichotomous explanatory variables with two-way interactions or relevance regressed on response variable APPROVE in an ANOVA Model. APPROVE is the probability of approval assigned to each loan case by the loan officer ranging from 0 to 100%. MONITORING is a dichotomous explanatory measure coded 1 if the loan officer is given information updated and audited on a daily basis (continuous reporting basis), and coded 0 if the loan officer is given annual audited financial information and (unaudited) quarterly reports on its compliance with the agreed-to debt covenants traditional (traditional reporting basis). RISK is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the company is of high risk, and coded 0 otherwise. BANK_EXP is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the loan officer has a high level of bank experience, and coded 0 otherwise. CONFIDENCE is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the loan officer had a high level of confidence in his/her loan approval decision (loan officer assigned a confidence level of four or higher on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6), 0 if the loan officer had a low or neutral level of confidence in his/her loan approval decision (confidence level of three or lower). MONITORING *RISK is an interaction term that tests whether the relationship between audit approval and RISK is consistent at all levels of AUDIT. The variable was included in the study by Searcy et al. (2009) . MONITORING *CONFIDENCE is an interaction term that tests whether the impact confidence has on loan approval is consistent for both traditional and continuous reporting cases. 2 DF are the degrees of freedom. 3 F statistic tests how well the overall model and individual variables account for the response variable's behavior and are based on Type III, or partial sums of squares. 4 P-Value is the probability of arriving at the F Statistic by chance occurrence. 5 The R-square statistic measures the amount of variation in the response variable explained by the model. This statistic ranges from 0 to 1, with the larger the value the better the model's fit.
Figure 1
Relationship between confidence and monitoring type Table 4 displays the results of the contrasts confirming the significance of the mean differences. It appears confidence only impacts loan approval probability for the traditional treatment (p-value 0.019). In the CR treatment, confidence is not significant (p-value 0.348). The result is not too surprising given that the loan approval rate is somewhat high (> 53 percent) in the low confidence, CR cell. We also ran separate ANOVA models to confirm the contrast results. As shown in Table 5 , risk (p-value <0.001) and confidence (p-value 0.001) are highly significant in the traditional sample ANOVA model. Only risk is significant in the CR sample ANOVA model (p-value 0.001). Bank experience is not significant in either model. Table 3 .
The results so far have examined the variables assuming the loan application was from a new client. Searcy et al. (2009) have the loan officers make loan approval decisions considering the client is an existing client (five year relationship). The banking relationship variable is a within-subjects design. Table 6 presents the loan approval probabilities assigned by the loan officers for existing client loan applications. The cell assignments are unchanged from Table 2 . In other words, if a loan officer is in Cell 1 on Table 2 , then he/she is in Cell 1 on Table 6 . There are a couple of items worth noting. First, the loan approval probability in each cell is higher on Table  6 as compared to Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Diamond 1991) . Our interest is not in the within-subjects difference, but whether the differences between the cells are significant. Before examining cell differences, one other item is worth noting on Table 6 . All cells show loan approval probabilities higher than 50 percent, suggesting that, even with low confidence, loan officers are more likely than not to approve a loan application for an existing client. Table 7 displays the mean confidence levels for both conditions (new client, existing client). Panel A reports the confidence means for the cells reported on Table 2 . Low confidence cells have a mean confidence below 2.0, while high confidence cells report a mean confidence above 5.0. Notice in Panel B a low confidence condition really does not exist. The lowest confidence mean is 3.8 (Cell 3). 4 It appears the presence of a banking relationship greatly improves loan officers' confidence in assigning loan approval probabilities, regardless of monitoring type.
